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ABSTRACT 
This paper asks whether and how an artefact, such as a robot, 
could be considered a citizen. In doing so, it approaches questions 
of political freedom and artefacts. Three key notions emerge in the 
discussion: discursivity, embodiment and recognition. Overall, 
discussion of robot citizenship raises technical, political and 
philosophical problems.  
 
Whereas machine intelligence is hotly debated, machine 
citizenship is less so. However, much research and activity is 
underway that seeks to create robot companions, capable of 
meaningful and intimate relationships with humans. The EU 
flagship “Robot Companions for Citizens” project aims for “...an 
ecology of sentient machines that will help and assist humans in 
the broadest possible sense to support and sustain our welfare.”1 
 
This is a broad and ambitious aim, with a goal of making artefacts 
that can have genuine relationships with humans. This being so, in 
order to avoid merely creating highly interactive automata, the 
status of the robot must be carefully considered. Without 
significant public freedoms, for instance, the notion of a robot 
‘friend’ would be a dubious one – as dubious as the notion of a 
‘willing slave’, for instance. In a broad sense, these issues relate 
1 In the Strategic Partnership for Robotics in Europe Multi-
Annual Roadmap (http://sparc-robotics.eu/about/) specific 
mention is made of "The ethical and social implications of 
social robots". In a broad conception of ‘social’, companionship 
and kinship between human and machine, human and 
programme, as well as inter-artefactual mutual reliances, 
partnerships, vulnerabilities and so on must be considered. 
Where genuine relationships are aimed at, discussions must go 
well beyond straightforward issues of human protection 
(http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/stamp/stamp.jsp?tp=&arnumber=575
1970). 
to the politics of robot kinship and sociality, perhaps specifically 
to civic epistemology. With a technological ideal of genuine 
human-artefactual kinship in the future, these political questions 
cannot be ignored. One approach to this problematic involves 
accounting for the robot citizen. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The creation of a robot citizen cannot be achieved by purely 
technical means: citizenship throughout this paper concerns 
taking an interest. It is not clear that any amount of engineering 
can build this, nor have it be accepted as such by others. But there 
is an ineliminable technical part of the problem – not least in 
designing and building appropriate embodiment and cognitive 
faculties (it should be stressed that cognition is not purely 
facultative, though the faculties may be a necessary condition). 
However to truly achieve kinship with robots (as a shorthand for a 
variety of possibilities, e.g. machines, software, programmes), 
recognition must occur, or else every alleged companionship 
interaction would be dubious in the extreme. As with many 
aspects of human-human interaction (e.g. gender, race, 
occupation) the kind of human-robot recognition here required 
has a philosophico-political content that cannot be avoided. 
 
This paper here hopes to develop a sketch of what would need to 
be the case for a robot to be considered a citizen, but not a 
manifesto and certainly not a guarantee. 
 
The question of whether a robot could be a citizen is considered 
in terms of the conditions that would have to apply in order for a 
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robot to share in place-making, where ‘place-making’ is an 
elaboration upon merely sharing space.2 Citizens are explained as 
sharers of place, whereas anything can share a space with 
anything else. 
 
The investigation will begin by looking at citizenship in very 
general terms, drawing upon Aristotle and Kant to substantiate the 
idea of ‘taking an interest.’ Drawing upon further philosophical 
thought from Searle and Habermas, the things in which citizens 
take an interest will be looked at. Finally, through the concept of 
embodiment, an exploration of how a robot could be thought of as 
taking an interest will be discussed. 
2. CITIZENSHIP 
The ability to contribute to the governance of one’s political 
community is the notion central to citizenship in Aristotle’s 
Politics Book III [2].  
Aristotle makes a distinction between strict citizenship and 
qualified citizenship [2, pp1176ff]. The former can only be 
enjoyed by those free from service. This is to ensure that at any 
point citizens might be free to take part in governance. This is 
very much an active citizenship definition, one wherein the 
disposition toward political action is the marker of civic identity. 
Not all might enjoy the freedom to participate in governance that 
strict citizenship requires, notably in Aristotle’s time slaves, 
women and foreigners. Foreigners could at least enjoy qualified 
citizenship. The point is none of these groups is thought of as 
being capable of contributing to governance, and so none can be 
politically active to the extent stipulated necessary for full civic 
identity 
At the core, we can interpret beyond various ancient Athenian 
distinctions and  say that citizenship is divided into at least two 
general groups which are citizens in a strict sense, and citizens in 
a qualified sense. For the citizen in a strict sense, the ability to 
take part in governance is a requirement. This in turn requires that 
those to be considered citizens must be free from impediments 
such as trades, poverty and service. 
At least in principle, it would seem robots could easily fit the bill 
concerning freedom from trades, poverty and service. Were a 
robot to be constructed such that it had at least the semblance of 
free will, it would have no particular need to do any particular 
thing. That would rule out the need for a trade or service. 
Similarly, imagining a robot that was self-sufficient to the extent 
that many objects are, poverty would be no hindrance. It would 
not necessarily even be relevant. Yet, on this preliminary 
thumbnail sketch, this would not lead intuitively to an urge to 
partake in governance – where would be the impetus? This is one 
facet of the problematic which will be explored later, especially 
from section 4. 
Aristotle’s reasoning for granting unqualified citizenship to a 
particular group is that political society ought to exist for ‘noble 
actions’ and that these can issue only from a community, rather 
than from a mere alliance of various sorts of people. Aristotle’s is 
a republican conception of citizenship, wherein participation or 
political agency is key. It assumes a fairly close agreement about 
2 The focus here isn’t on robot rights, a short history of which can 
be found at http://www.roboethics.org/icra2005/veruggio.pdf 
(bullet-points at the end point to the sources of concern) 
ideas of the good life and about the various privileges of those 
involved in the community. 
The republican model, in the shadow of Aristotle’s Athenian ideal 
(Maybe typified by Florentine ‘civic humanism’), may well be 
thought of as an impossible dream for modern, large, internally 
diverse and plural nation-states. If so, perhaps such republicanism 
can stand mainly as a critical standpoint from which to critique 
liberal political society. In fact, Kant can be read as hinting at 
something of a republico-liberal conception of the citizen, but on 
different grounds. 
3. Kant 
Kant suggests [9] that it is part of human nature that in society 
inevitable friction emerges as each individual seeks her own ends. 
This friction is offset by the claim that no single lifetime could 
feasibly accommodate the complete realisation of all of human 
beings’ capacities. So, Kant supposes, the entire history of 
humanity is the arena wherein human beings’ potential can be 
realised. This being so, politics is a necessary condition for human 
progress per se as it is politics that mediates the friction between 
the individual’s plans and the progress of the community of all 
humanity. [5, p35] 
 
In the context of an unfolding of humanity (of progress) and the 
necessity to act consistently with one's being an agent, one ought 
to do all one can to maximise the extent to which one can act and 
be unthwarted. From a historical point of view, social acting, on 
public reasons, is very important. Kant makes this point about law 
and freedom in terms of public and private reason, describing it as 
follows: Privately we must obey law, but always be ready publicly 
to challenge it: 
 
The public use of man's [sic] reason must always be 
free, and it alone can bring about enlightenment among 
men; the private use of reason may quite often be very 
narrowly restricted, however, without undue hindrance 
to the progress of enlightenment. But by the public use 
of one's own reason I mean that use which anyone may 
make of it as a man of learning addressing the entire 
reading public. What I term the private use of reason is 
that which a person may make of it in a particular civil 
post or office with which he is entrusted. [10] 
 
At its most general, the importance of careful reasoning in terms 
of the public draws upon Kant’s view on ‘sensus communis’. This 
isn’t ‘common sense’ as it would be known most widely, but 
rather is an a priori faculty of reasoning the denial of which 
would amount to a contradiction of agency in any given reasoner: 
 
...under the sensus communis we must include the Idea 
of a communal sense, i.e. of a faculty of judgement, 
which in its reflection takes account (a priori) of the 
mode of representation of all other men [sic] in thought; 
in order as it were to compare its judgement with the 
collective Reason of humanity, and thus to escape the 
illusion arising from the private conditions that could be 
so easily taken for objective, which would injuriously 
affect the judgement. This is done by comparing our 
judgement with the possible rather than the actual 
judgements of others, and by putting ourselves in the 
place of any other man, by abstracting from the 
                                                                
limitations which contingently attach to our own 
judgement. [11, §40] 
 
The sensus communis is a form of individual judgement that takes 
into account others’ partial ways of representing matters. The 
point of this is to scrutinise particular judgements in this light of 
general human reason. This should avoid the individual, partial 
perspectives on matters that although personally compelling, 
could in general have a detrimental effect on any judgment made. 
From this constitutive principle of judgements in agents per se 
springs a motivation for taking an interest in public (or social) 
matters, taking care in that interest, and hoping others do likewise. 
 
The republican elements of this, similar to Aristotle’s view, are 
that shared community is important and an interest ought to be 
taken in it. It is to be cultivated privately by respectfully following 
the law that structures it, and publicly by challenging those tenets 
of the law inadequate to it. The liberal part of this conception has 
it that politics, via law, protects the citizen in terms of their 
personal freedoms. Citizenship sees its domain in the interaction 
between the private and public spheres. Citizenship here is to be 
thought of distributively, rather than as an aggregative notion.3 
 
In short, drawing on Aristotle and Kantian thought, citizens must 
be a community, with a sense of community, and at least be 
disposed to taking an interest in the governance of that 
community. This will be referred to as ‘place-making’, over above 
mere sharing of space. The persistence of place-making comes 
through the fact that many citizens are interested in how things are 
run, how they could be better run, and the ends at which the 
running aims. From this starting point, place-making can now be 
elaborated upon, and its conditions laid out in order to determine 
what would need to be the case for a robot to take part in it, 
thereby grounding the chance of citizenship. 
 
4. Place-making 
The simple-looking question, “Where are you?” offers at least two 
potentially controversial interpretations. On the one hand, the 
question can be answered in terms of space. Answering in this 
way might involve the reporting of a set of co-ordinates relative to 
a grid. The question might also be answered in terms of place. 
This could involve the reporting of a more varied set of factors. 
These can be seen in an example from ‘Mediterranean studies’: 
If the classic work of Fernand Braudel (1949) tends to view 
the Mediterranean over the long term as a grand space or 
spatial crossroads in exchange, trade, diffusion and 
connectivity between a set of grand source areas to the south, 
north and east, the recent revisionist account of Peregrine 
Horden and Nicholas Purcell (2000) views the 
Mediterranean region as a congeries of micro-ecologies or 
3 We can take from one of Kant’s successors, Fichte, a parallel 
with his moral thinking, specifically the categorical imperative, 
and see the application for citizenship. The I and the not-I enjoy 
a mutual dependence, which is one reason for the necessity of 
treating others as ends on themselves – not to do so is to deny 
the mutuality of the I and not-I hence to deny oneself in a 
fundamental sense. Put briefly, to act against the other is not 
even to act but to be determined by a lack of understanding of 
what it is to be an actor, and agent, at all. 
places separated by distinctive agricultural and social 
practices in which connectivity and mobility within the 
region is more a response to the management of 
environmental and social risks than the simple outcome of 
extra-regional initiatives. [1] 
The first view is one that thinks of space in geometrical terms, 
whereas the second has a more holisitic view, drawing upon 
dynamic interests including the social. The latter is the place-
making notion here put forward. An illustration might be helpful. 
If Alice states that she is in Ireland, as opposed to in England, she 
means more than being simply further west than her London-
based colleagues. Irish laws are different. Different customs 
operate. Different expectations mount when exploring Dublin as 
opposed to Dulwich, Dover (or Dresden, Darwin or anywhere 
else). This kind of difference between places over and above 
spaces is related to a holisitic notion of institutional reality, and 
social ontology, of the locations. This reality and ontology are the 
objects of interest for the engaged citizen. 
4.1 Institutional Reality and Social Ontology 
Institutional reality is a background to action for citizens. It offers 
a mode in which reasons can come which can warrant action in 
public. Reasons are required for action qua action and 
institutional reality provides a scheme from which are derivable 
desire-transcendent reasons (reasons not necessarily based in a 
metaphorical inner marketplace of competing personal desires) 
[14, p167ff] and a scheme via which desire can be articulated. 
Thus it presents a scheme from which action can result. 
Searle describes how human beings have, 
...the capacity to impose functions on objects and people 
where the objects and the people cannot perform the 
functions solely in virtue of their physical structure. The 
performance of the function requires that there be a 
collectively recognized status that the person or object has, 
and it is only in virtue of that status that the person or object 
can perform the function in question. [13, p7] 
Status functions are concerned with the rules that constitute one 
thing as another in a context, e.g. a piece of paper as a payment in 
a shop, a person as a general in a war, a thrown towel as a 
submission. These things are declared into existence and so the 
normative power of speech acts makes something in the world 
that previously there was not. Searle here is flagging the social 
commitments and entitlements that constitute institutional reality. 
These commitments and entitlements serve to populate social 
ontology, moreover, as they are what create money rather than 
mere slips of paper; no-parking zones rather than mere tracts of 
land; a round of beers rather than a mere collection of liquids. 
The collectivity of this is important. There is reciprocity at work 
without which these commitments and entitlements would become 
empty or disintegrate. There is then the question of who, or 
what, is taken as capable of ascribing, recognising and taking on 
social commitments of the sort that they can take part in the 
institutions of money, gambling etc. The question is actually 
familiar. Some people at some points are considered too young to 
take part in various institutions (in the UK, full time work for 
under 16s, 18 for gambling or drinking alcohol, 65 for receiving a 
bus pass). The roles are as much ascribed as the institutions: a 
bartender can sell beers she doesn't own, as she occupies a role 
given to her by the licensee, but she can't trade stocks in that role 
                                                                
– there isn't a way in which my purchasing a Guinness can prompt 
Lloyds to remunerate the bartender or my portfolio to diversify. 
She isn't taken as a stock broker nor can she be both bartending 
for the bar and trading for Lloyds at the same time: illegitimacy in 
one or both roles creeps in. We can say from this that in 
occupying various roles and fulfilling them well, people mutually 
enact institutional and social reality. 
The link between the enacting of institutional and social reality 
and place-making is worth highlighting at this point. It seems a 
clear advance beyond ‘mere’ space-sharing to be a constituent 
part of the possibilities for choice and action for oneself and 
others. In terms of the communitarian aspects of Aristotle and 
Kant mentioned above, this can also be seen in terms of taking an 
interest in the life of the community in that occupying these roles 
helps to constitute what can be expected in that very community. 
4.1.1 The robot enacting social reality? 
Whereas above it was asked from where the impetus to get 
involved in governance might arise for a robot, here the question 
becomes more complex: 
• Could the robot be taken for something capable of 
ascribing status functions on one thing or another? 
• To what extent could the robot enact institutional and 
social reality? 
At the risk of littering the argument with too many rhetorical 
questions, this latest pair will remain hanging until the notion of 
enacting institutional and social reality is explored a little further. 
This can be done via Searle’s notion of ‘the Background’ and the 
idea of ‘civic nous’. 
4.2 ‘The Background’ 
The role of social commitment as a structure to public action is 
ineliminable. There is a basic, possibly tacit, civic nous that 
guides interaction that can vary between place and place. In 
Searle, this is called ‘the Background’ [13, p135]. The 
Background is a set of mental states, not necessarily present to the 
mind at a given time, that sets up what the meaning of intentional 
states can be: they provide the expected from which divergence is 
noticeable (e.g. picking up an apparently heavy suitcase only to 
find it is a helium balloon shaped like a case. The surprise is 
analogous for the presence of the Background, though at any 
particular stage it wasn't called upon.) 
Another way of thinking about it is as the set of justifications one 
would offer were one's routines to be interrogated (e.g. Why did 
you mime writing? I caught the waiter’s eye – the bill has to be 
paid). 
In terms of civic nous, the Background includes the capacity to 
recognise that standing on the left of a London Underground 
escalator constitutes a faux pas. The Background will underwrite 
spotting the error of an Englishman in Belfast inviting someone 
for a drink and actually having just one drink (rather than at least 
two). Whilst these sorts of examples might seem to indicate that 
the Background is simply a set of propositions, norms to be borne 
in mind, Searle argues [12, p156-7] that it is in fact not based in a 
mind-independent reality, but rather helps to structure the very 
reality that is inhabited. By way of another analogy it might be 
said that the flow of the Thames and that of the Soar look 
fundamentally alike. Invisible to the unaided eye is the bed that 
shapes and helps determine the unique way each river flows. In 
this analogy, ‘the Background’ is the riverbed, invisibly 
structuring the surface flow. It is something like a transcendental 
condition for the surface phenomenon – that x without which y 
could not be y at all – or of the Heideggerian ‘immer schon’ 
category that which is always already present.4 
The London commuter doesn’t hold in their mind any rules about 
escalators in order to avoid icy stares, having absorbed the fact 
that standing should only be on the right. The Belfast socialite 
doesn’t consciously repeat the mantra that ‘a drink’ includes 
buying one back. Rather, each "...evolve a set of dispositions that 
are sensitive to the rule structure..." [13, p.145], where ‘the rule 
structure’ is the sets of social commitments collectively 
undertaken (without ceremony) in the context of the institutional 
reality in question. 
Civic nous of this sort is the capacity to recognise contingency 
when the expected reality is deformed. Or again we might say that 
the Background manifests in social situations as that which gives 
content to surprise. This would suggest that contextualised 
cognition, this civic nous, is embedded in the institutional and 
social environment in which it appears, to allude once more to 
Heidegger, it is always already part of the logic of public being 
and public action, on which some more needs to be said. 
4.3 Action 
If we imagine a purely physical space of action, we can think of 
the laws of physics as the conditions for actions. The limitations 
of the body in contact with other surfaces are the limits of 
possibility here. The actions of the hypothetical dweller within the 
merely physical space are simply the instrumental interventions on 
the transcendent space. A physical space, if it is to be appreciated 
as a place in the sense here being used, will be a sphere of 
reasons besides. 
Civic nous, the Background, collective status functions all come 
into play in a place. The intentions of the place-dweller, 
moreover, are structured according to the logic of the place: for 
instance, in wanting to buy something in London, Sterling is 
sought, rather than Euros. Places are shared spaces of action and 
so they come with a kind of a logical structure. Reasons can come 
in the sense of logical entailment or pragmatic presupposition, or 
more generalised warranty considerations regarding the sincerity 
and legitimacy of actions, among other things. I can command 
you to do something only if I’m warranted by being suitably 
superior in some regard. You can trust in my promise only if I am 
judged to sincerely undertake my obligation. Such warranty 
considerations occur within contexts like that of truth-
preservation, wherein logical relations are of central importance, 
but operate on a less parsimonious conception of reasons than 
logical premises and inference rules. These reasons concern truth, 
truthfulness and normative rightness. 
Assertions are obviously linked with truth, expressives with 
truthfulness (sincerity), and commands (etc.) with normative 
rightness (legitimacy or accountability). These three ways in 
which queries can be raised in conversation are themselves raised 
in Habermas’ discussions of ‘the validity basis of speech’ as 
characterised in the late 1970s [13, p119]. 
4 See, for instance, Heidegger, M. (1996) Being and Time, trans 
Joan Stambaugh, Albany: State University of New York Press § 
32, pp. 140-41 
                                                                
The validity basis of speech is based upon the fundamental 
thought that in the very act of uttering, a speaker is claiming to be: 
• giving [the hearer] something to understand 
• making himself thereby understandable; and 
• coming to an understanding with another person. 
These are three ‘world relations’ taken to be implicit in speech 
action; fully successful speech acts must satisfy conditions of 
truth, sincerity and rightness (i.e. legitimacy according to some 
specifiable lights). [7, p75] 
In the context of the robot citizen, the important question here is 
whether these world relations can be enjoyed by an artefactual 
agent. Or again, if such relations can be enjoyed, can they be 
recognised? The importance of these questions will be seen to 
hinge on some further details of the Habermasian account, and its 
relation to action in public, therefore to place-making over and 
above the mere sharing of space. 
4.3.1 Further adventures in Habermas 
Habermas supposes that validity claims in each of these three 
spheres can be raised and redeemed in communicative encounters, 
which amounts to raising and redeeming claims by means of 
argument. This being the case, validity in spheres beyond that of 
truth can be thought of as involving a notion of correctness 
appropriate to their own standards as truth is appropriate to claims 
of factual accuracy. 
In this context, the phrase “validity claim,” as a translation of the 
German term Geltungsanspruch, does not have the narrow logical 
sense (truth-preserving argument forms), but rather connotes a 
richer social idea—that a claim (statement) merits the addressee's 
acceptance because it is justified or true in some sense, which can 
vary according to the sphere of validity and dialogical context. [3] 
By validity claims, then, is meant symbolic or explicitly made 
defensible propositions, sensitive to context; “A validity claim is 
equivalent to the assertion that the conditions for the validity of an 
utterance are fulfilled.” [7, p38] 
This is not necessarily the validity in which logicians are 
primarily interested, but rather must be taken to include in its 
scope the nuanced sense utilised above. Given we are in 
communication and not in some way merely noting one another’s 
utterances, or in a therapy session or some other special type of 
interaction, we have to expect to be able to assume boundaries 
that themselves engender questions clustering around these three 
themes. That is to say, there are features of conversational 
interaction per se that we ought to be able to rely upon as 
underwriting expectations that can be shared by speaker and 
audience alike regarding the reasons that ought to be pertinent to 
their utterances. Reasons come in different flavours but can in 
general be requested owing to queries based in truth, sincerity and 
accountability.  
In communication, then, what is of most interest is the role of 
rational compulsion as opposed to any other kind of motivation, 
such as fear of sanctions, for instance. The rationality associated 
with the simple securing of aims efficiently, instrumental (means: 
end) rationality, Habermas calls ‘cognitive-instrumental’ 
rationality. The concepts that would redeem validity claims in this 
context are simply those that, presupposing some goal, would 
with little fuss secure that goal. Habermas says that this much is 
true but goes on to stress the role of the criticisability of the 
knowledge claims in this area that is important but often 
overlooked. 
The instrumental account presupposes knowledge of goals, 
circumstances and available means toward ends. Since with 
respect to each of these areas of presumed knowledge we can be 
mistaken, other people are apt to be able to show us that we are 
mistaken, perhaps by pointing out something that we’ve 
overlooked about the situation, for example. 
Immediately, with this recognition, communicative rationality has 
expanded beyond the boundaries of mere means: end rationality. 
Now included in the list of presumed knowledge is knowledge of 
goals, circumstances, means toward ends and reasons and 
consequences (or ramifications). In short, the recognition of the 
criticisability of some presumed position opens a horizon for 
fallible propositional knowledge. 
In acts of assertion, Habermas believes, the same knowledge is 
put to work as in teleological reasoning, but in a significantly 
different way. In action aimed at some goal, the actor can assess 
the rationality of their action alone and in silence. A criticisable 
assertion on the other hand must be rationally appraised in 
communication. It must be backed up with reasons or shown to be 
baseless with reference to another speaker’s assertions in a public 
space of reasons. 
A further extension of this simple realisation allows more 
candidates for rational appraisal than actions and assertions. If 
propositional contents can be rationally appraised on the basis of 
the redemption of the validity claims they raise, then other classes 
of expression too will be capable of rational appraisal based in the 
validity of the claims that they raise. 
In contexts of communicative action, we will call someone 
rational not only if he is able to put forward an assertion and, 
when criticized, to provide grounds for it by pointing to 
appropriate evidence, but also if he is following an 
established norm and is able, when criticized, to justify his 
action by explicating the given situation in the light of 
legitimate expectations. We even call someone rational if he 
makes known a desire or intention, expresses a feeling or a 
mood, shares a secret, confesses a deed etc. and is then able 
to reassure critics in regard to the revealed experience by 
drawing practical consequences from it and behaving 
consistently thereafter. [7, p15] 
Thus, for an account of rationality larger than the mere means: 
end variety, we have to consider intersubjective communication in 
all its familiar forms. An intersubjective account of rationality has 
to include the possibility of validity of spheres such as those of 
sincerity, truth, efficacy, appropriateness, legitimacy etc. since 
these constitute real parts of communication. The spectrum along 
which validity claims can be raised and redeemed is thus much 
wider than merely goal-directed action and assertion. 
4.3.2 Citizen-rationality and a public space of 
reasons 
For any putative public agent, and so any citizen, this world of 
reason-giving and critique is a sine qua non. It is so owing to the 
requirement that place-making involves the holistic features noted 
from Mediterranean studies and the notion of public reasons. This 
is relevant to place-making as place-making requires taking an 
interest in the environment as a rationally structured space of 
reasons, as outlined in Searle’s position. The critical potential 
contained within the dialogical account of citizen-rationality 
being outlined here makes the notion of acceptability important. 
Acceptability, in short, must be a reasoned acceptance, not an 
external determination, by a citizen of a norm, value, rule or what 
have you. 
With this idea fleshed out by drawing upon Searle and Habermas, 
on the rationale given by Aristotelian and Kantian thought, we 
now have an account of what citizens ought to be thought of as 
taking an interest in (institutional reality and social ontology). We 
also have a way of understanding how they might take such an 
interest (Habermas’ validity-theoretic account). What remains to 
be explored are the conditions that would have to obtain in order 
to grant access to this citizen-rationality and social institutional 
reality. In exploring this, some of the rhetorical questions raise so 
far can begin to be addressed. 
5. Robot access to validity spheres? 
The know-how brought to bear in being able to navigate the 
various contexts in which citizens routinely operate is embedded 
within the world in which they arise. Social action and social 
performances depend on facts about the world around us, 
including other citizens who are themselves enacting the 
institutional and social aspects of that world. That these terms 
arise in the manner that they do is interesting. Given so much of 
place-making (status functions, institutional reality, the 
Background, civic nous) is concerned with the contingencies of 
getting on in a shared, reason-providing environment which is 
enacted by those who inhabit it, it is highly probable that 
embodiment is central here too. This will be explored by way of 
the so-called ‘4Es’ programme. This will begin to answer the 
questions raised above concerning the possibility, the impetus, 
that a robot could have for taking an interest in public life. This 
will be a beginning to understanding the conditions that would 
need to obtain for the robot to be understood as a place-making 
citizen. 
5.1 Embodiment 
Drawing upon the ‘4Es’ research paradigm, it is possible to gloss 
a few relatively recent developments in thinking about cognition. 
These developments suggest that cognition is: 
• Extended 
o the material vehicles underpinning cognitive 
states and processes can extend beyond the 
boundaries of the cognizing organism. 
• Enactive 
o It depends on aspects of the activity of the 
cognizing organism 
• Embodied 
o cognitive properties and performances can 
crucially depend on facts about our 
embodiment 
• Embedded 
o cognitive properties and performances can 
crucially depend on facts about our 
relationship to the surrounding environment5 
While these are intended to be read as insights to cognition, they 
can be deployed here in the context of this discussion of the robot 
citizen. The following sections will make the necessary 
connections to demonstrate this. 
Thinking about the mere space-dweller, we can easily see parallels 
with various artefacts. For example, we might think of a robot 
mapping its environment by means of measuring paths of free 
travel and plotting obstacles so as to come to a geometry or a 
topography of the immediate area.6 Were we to anthropomorphise 
here we could suppose the robot to be interested only in empirical 
truths concerning the environment. In considering the possibility 
of an artefactual citizen, however, it has to be asked whether and 
how a robot, programme or machine could get on with place-
making. 
This is now the opportunity to begin addressing the rhetorical 
questions raised earlier, viz: 
 
• From where might the impetus to get involved in 
governance arise for a robot? 
And 
• Could the robot be taken for something capable of 
ascribing status functions on one thing or another? To 
what extent could the robot enact institutional and 
social reality? 
What would need to be the case for a robot to meet the criteria for 
being a place-maker? Much of place-making is concerned with the 
contingencies of taking an interest in a shared environment, it 




“...the material vehicles underpinning cognitive states and 
processes can extend beyond the boundaries of the cognizing 
organism (Clark & Chalmers, 1998; Hurley, 1998; Clark, 
2008).Cognition is enactive – that is, dependent on aspects of 
the activity of the cognizing organism (Varela, Thompson & 
Rosch, 1991; Hurley, 1998; Noë, 2004; Thompson 2007). 
Cognition is embodied – our cognitive properties and 
performances can crucially depend on facts about our 
embodiment (Haugeland, 1998; Clark, 1997; Gallagher, 2000). 
Cognition is embedded – our cognitive properties and 
performances can crucially depend on facts about our 
relationship to the surrounding environment (Haugeland, 1998; 
Clark, 1997; Hurley, 1998,). Finally, cognition is affective 
(Colombetti, 2007; Ratcliffe, 2009) – that is, intimately 
dependent upon the value of the object of cognition to the 
cognizer.” 
6 For a brief overview see Thrun, S., Robotic Mapping: A Survey, 
http://robots.stanford.edu/papers/thrun.mapping-tr.pdf, 2002 
                                                                
seems likely that embodiment is central here.7 Were citizens to be 
each of radically differing physical forms, the emergence of an 
institutional reality would not be clearly of interest to any 
particular individual. Nor might such an emergence be possible — 
what might constitute general social norms for groups so diverse 
as to have radically different vulnerabilities and strengths? 
Were citizens to be each of radically differing physical forms, the 
emergence of an institutional reality would not be clearly of 
interest to any particular individual. Where height, say, ranged 
randomly from millimetres to hundreds of meters, little sense 
could be made for, say, urban planning. Could a robot embodied 
as a dense, cubic kilometre of titanium, regardless of its faculties 
or apparent consciousness, possibly be understood as having 
interests in the environment comparable to putative fellow 
citizens? Or again, where a robot was embodied as a vast network 
of informational nods, ranging across galaxies, with an emergent 
consciousness, what sense could anyone make of it as a fellow 
burgher? It seems unlikely that such cases would permit the sort 
of sensus communis reasoning from Kant, or a comprehension of 
what validity claims could arise for such a being. 
Another way in which embodiment reveals itself to be important 
in this context is in terms of the linguistic foundation to 
institutional reality that Searle points to and that Habermas 
elaborates. We can think of money as a promise, for example. 
Sterling notes actually state explicitly that they are promises from 
the bank to ‘pay the bearer on demand.’ Status functions in 
general are declared into existence and remain in existence 
through collective acknowledgment. The Background too can be 
seen as importantly linguistic, as the set of possible or 
counterfactual, justifications one would have given for an 
otherwise wordlessly performed act. 
The particular way in which social beings are embodied plays a 
role in how and why they assign status functions the way they do, 
and so the institutional reality in which they act. The Background 
informs their mutual interactions like the terrain informs the way 
someone walks around. Civic nous has the impact on social action 
it does because it matters that another’s social actions ought to be 
able to be anticipated and so personal actions not be perpetually 
frustrated. 
Similarly with the case of the Background and civic nous, 
nowhere in particular is there a locus of this knowledge. There is a 
generalised pervasion of nudges, sways, insights and hints that 
constitute civic knowledge, that is, the knowledge of how to 
traverse institutional reality. From politeness on escalators, 
queuing for buses, paying bills, ordering beers in bars... laws, 
customs, habits, practices are nowhere codified once-and-for-all 
but rather they are more or less in any scenario to the extent that 
any given action is open to criticism or praise on how it matches 
up to this non-linear set of things. 
7 In terms of robot rights embodiment arises too. See for instance, 
a discussion on 'building in' ethics to robots mentioning 




p.3 especially, the humanoid form is mentioned. 
 
Any artefact would seem therefore to need to be embodied in a 
comparable way to its social counterparts if it was to be 
considerable as a citizen. Any robot citizen would very likely need 
to be on a generally humanoid scale, with vulnerabilities similar 
to those of other humans.8 
If civic, social or institutional reality is enacted by those whose 
relevant cognitive ability is embodied and reliant on 
being embedded amid details of the environment, then it 
is extended. The fact that this reality is extended makes it clear 
that it is public and up for grabs in a public way. No amount of 
navel-gazing reflection can arrive at a definition of what counts as 
this reality or its proper participants. Using the concept of 
recognition, we turn now to this last point. 
5.2 Recognition 
Could a public really detach itself from the view of the robot as 
servant? Could any given social group genuinely come to perceive 
the actions of robots as free in a robust sense? Given what has 
been said about embodiment just now, it could be guessed that a 
humanoid robot would stand a better chance than something 
thoroughly unlike a human in appearance. But it might also be 
guessed that even the most human-like robot would see 
diminished esteem upon the revelation of its artefactual nature. 
These are empirical questions, and themselves internally complex 
(i.e. is the possibility in question logical, practical, psychological 
etc.) 
If the answers came in the negative, regardless of the actual 
capacities of the robot, none could ever be anything but a subject 
of oppression. Where recognition of agency is missing, there 
could be no chance of a full exercise of that very agency. In the 
republican senses of citizenship above this is the case owing to 
the unrecognised being unfree to take part in civic life, 
governance or the life of the community. In terms of Searle, the 
problem would be the robot not being taken as capable of 
enacting social reality. The suspicion of human citizens might be 
that the robot isn’t experiencing ‘the background’ as the riverbed 
to their stream of action. Rather, something inauthentic might be 
suspected – behaviour in accordance with social norms read as 
rules. At best, the robot in these circumstances could enjoy only 
qualified citizenship, at worst be deemed imposter. 
Bryson provides a perspective on robot identity that presses this 
negative line. [4] In this view, the robot is always, no matter how 
it is realised, an artefact directed by, and for the use of, human 
beings. The argument for this includes the claim that since human 
beings design, manufacture, own and operate robots, these robots 
are entirely the responsibility of human beings. This places them 
at the disposal of human beings, with at most the status of servant. 
Under no circumstances ought personhood or anything like it be 
attributed to the robot, on Bryson’s analysis. To make such 
attributions would be to distribute incorrectly responsibilities and 
resources. 
Certainly, in the area of interpersonal relationships this would be 
deeply problematic. Where a companion is sought, in the sense of 
8 One could imagine the argument running for other types of 
being in a similar way, such that humanoid scale mammals or 
artefacts would be problematic for them. Ditto softbots. The 
provision of a typology isn’t the focus here, but could be a very 
interesting undertaking. 
                                                                
                                                                
a friend or partner, the freedom of the other is a necessary 
condition. Where that freedom is diminished in some way, 
relationships are possible but from a narrower base of, say, 
functional interdependencies. In the absence of robot freedom, 
robot companionship beyond such an interdependence is a non-
starter.9 
5.2.1 Servant machines 
Bryson (ibid) offers a position paper and, perhaps as a result, the 
argument is somewhat unclear. A fourfold condition is deployed 
to underwrite the properly servile nature of the robot. The design, 
manufacture, owning and operation of robots raise different 
issues, especially with respect to responsibility. For example, 
where a robot’s behaviour leads to, say, personal injury it is an 
open question as to whether the responsibility for this lies in the 
design, manufacture, ownership or operation of the robot. 
Whether the designer, manufacturer, owner or operator is to take 
the blame for the bad outcomes is a serious question with 
potentially very high stakes.10 
If the position stated in Bryson doesn’t exhibit a genetic fallacy, 
discounting robot freedom on the basis of robot origins alone, its 
soundness might still be questioned. The part of the argument 
presented here11 that robots cannot be more than servants states 
that: 
1.) nothing designed, manufactured, owned and operated 
by human beings can be anything but for our use 
2.) robots are designed, manufactured, owned and operated 
by human beings 
3.) robots cannot be anything but for our use 
 
Whilst this is a valid argument as it stands, assumption 1 seems to 
be controversial. A tremendous literature and research culture 
exists precisely to investigate the issues that would verify or 
falsify the proposition. It seems too quick to rely on this as 
assumption when much of what is at issue is contained within the 
very proposition. In fact, assumption 1 seems like a refusal to 
recognise robots as having a status beyond servant. 
In fact, it seems evident that no matter the success or failure of the 
research programme aimed at clarifying the notions of assumption 
1, it is not a guarantee that human beings would accept or reject 
robots as more than servants. The recognition of robots as 
citizens, or of any x as y, would in part involve what non-robots 
are willing to recognise as social or political involvement. 
9 And so the EU programme already mentioned would be a 
misguided novelty cf. http://www.robotcompanions.eu/ 
10 See, for instance, the case of military robots: Taddeo, M., 
‘Information Warfare: A Philosophical Perspective’ In 
Philosophy & Technology, March 2012, Volume 25, Issue 1, pp 
105-120, 28 Jul 2011 
11 This isn’t the only argument presented in Bryson’s paper. An 
extended mind position is presented, for instance, urging a la 
Chalmers that robots can be thought of as extensions of our own 
minds. Perhaps so, but the assertion is too strong in being 
context-insensitive: friends, relatives, enemies and strangers 
could all be so thought of in the right context. It doesn’t 
determine that robots can at most be servants. 
As has been argued elsewhere (in a different context), this cuts 
both ways. In the same way that machines could possibly be 
recognised as members of a community, “...so too might an 
unquestionably facultative being, of silicon, carbon, or anything 
else, be excluded or unrecognised where no such well of esteem 
exists.” [6] 
The refusal to recognise as valid institutional or social action 
subverts the status of the putative actor regardless of their innate 
nature. Action in context, recognised as such, is central to 
ascribing citizenship. From Searle’s account, this active, context-
sensitive dynamism is clear. Building upon Searle’s account and 
drawing upon arguments above and the 4Es programme, it is 
possible to make a suggestion as to what would need to be the 
case for a robot to be recognised as a citizen: 
Where the robot is embodied such that it has interests in the 
nature of public space, it can be considered as capable of taking 
part in social cognition embedded in details of the environment. In 
this context, it could be possible to recognise the robot as 
enacting various institutional or social roles that could constitute 
or enrich this embedded social cognition. The interplay of these 
extrinsic factors, open to recognition or not, would demonstrate 
the extended nature of institutional and social reality. 
6. Conclusion 
This paper pursued the following strategy in exploring what 
would need ot be the case for the possibility of a robot citizen: 
It discussed citizenship in general terms, drawing upon a notion of 
‘taking an interest’ and substantiated this with reference to 
Aristotle. An absence of dependence upon power is used in 
Aristotle as a sine qua non for strict, unqualified citizenship. Kant 
provided an even more general means of understanding the need 
for other-directed reflection where agency is at stake. Drawing 
upon Kant’s account to make a political agenda, there is the sense 
that reason ought to constrain power, as private and public reason 
are contrasted. Between these two thinkers, a view of the 
individual and community is advanced, with a central place for 
freedom and reason. 
The argument then discussed in what an interest should be taken, 
by the nascent citizen (once more in abstract terms). This was the 
‘shape’ of institutional or social reality and this contextualised in 
a civic setting the sort of free and other-directed reasoning seen in 
the first step. Searle and Habermas provided material here which 
provided the objects for civic reasoning, but access to these 
object, or to this context, for the robot remained unresolved. How 
the robot citizen could gain this access was discussed in terms of 
embodiment, and the associated notion of recognition. 
For the robot to be considered a citizen there is an onus on non-
robots to recognise a robot citizen – robots can’t be thought of as 
mere objects subject to arbitrary power. This is no small 
undertaking, especially when it is considered that many human 
beings still refuse such recognition for other human beings. An 
essential part of gaining recognition is the embodiment of the 
robot citizen 
It was shown that embodiment was not just a simple device to 
garner esteem through mutual likeness between robot and non-
robot. Rather, embodiment opens doors to enactivism, embedded 
social cognition and it acknowledges the extended nature of 
institutional and social reality. It provides a way in which to 
understand how things can come to matter to the robot citizen as 
                                                                
they might matter to the non-robot citizen. It is a way in which the 
robot can be thought of as taking an interest. This lays the 
groundwork for the possibility of place-making beyond mere 
space-sharing, hence of citizenship. 
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